Security Matrix¶

Security posture of each AKM suite: known attacks, crackable outputs, and corresponding hashcat modes.

WiFi Security Timeline¶

flowchart LR
    WEP["WEP\n1997\nRC4 broken"] --> WPA["WPA/TKIP\n2003\nInterim fix"]
    WPA --> WPA2["WPA2/CCMP\n2004\n802.11i"]
    WPA2 --> PMF["PMF (802.11w)\n2009\nMgmt protection"]
    PMF --> WPA3["WPA3/SAE\n2018\nDragonfly PAKE"]
    WPA3 --> REV["802.11-2024\nAKM 19-25\nSHA-384 suites"]

    style WEP fill:#c0392b,color:#fff
    style WPA fill:#e67e22,color:#fff
    style WPA2 fill:#f1c40f,color:#000
    style PMF fill:#27ae60,color:#fff
    style WPA3 fill:#2980b9,color:#fff
    style REV fill:#8e44ad,color:#fff

Security Status Table¶

AKM	Name	Status	Offline attack?	hashcat mode	Notes
N/A	WEP	Broken	RC4 key recovery (PTW)	N/A (WEPWolf / aircrack-ng)	40K ARP frames → key in seconds
WPA1	WPA-PSK (TKIP)	Vulnerable	Yes, PBKDF2 dict	22000 (kv1)	Legacy, vendor IE `00:50:F2:01`
1	802.1X (SHA-1)	Secure	No (EAP-dependent)	EAP inner method	PEAP/MSCHAPv2 inner: mode 5500
2	PSK (SHA-1)	Vulnerable	Yes, PBKDF2 dict	22000 (kv2)	Most common WPA2 network
3	FT-802.1X (SHA-256)	Secure	No	N/A
4	FT-PSK (SHA-256)	Vulnerable	Yes, EAPOL/PMKID	37100 (PR pending)
5	802.1X-SHA256	Secure	No	N/A
6	PSK-SHA256	Partially vulnerable	EAPOL: yes (kv3) / PMKID: broken	22000 (EAPOL only)	PMKID aux4 uses SHA1, needs SHA256
7	TDLS	N/A	No	N/A	Peer-to-peer, niche
8	SAE	Secure	No	N/A	Dragonfly PAKE, no offline attack
9	FT-SAE	Secure	No	N/A
10	APPeerKey	Deprecated	N/A	N/A	Removed from active standard
11	802.1X Suite B (SHA-256)	Deprecated	No	N/A	Deprecated per Table 9-190 NOTE 2
12	802.1X Suite B (SHA-384)	Secure	No	N/A	192-bit security level
13	FT-802.1X (SHA-384)	Secure	No	N/A
14	FILS-SHA256	Secure	No	N/A	Fast initial link setup
15	FILS-SHA384	Secure	No	N/A
16	FT-FILS-SHA256	Secure	No	N/A
17	FT-FILS-SHA384	Secure	No	N/A
18	OWE	Secure	No	N/A	Unauthenticated DH; no password
19	FT-PSK (SHA-384)	Vulnerable	Yes	none	No hashcat module; SHA-384 24 B MIC unsupported by any mode
20	PSK-SHA384	Vulnerable	Yes	none	No hashcat module exists or is planned
21	PASN	Secure	No	N/A	Pre-association security
22	FT-802.1X-SHA384	Secure	No	N/A
23	802.1X-SHA384	Secure	No	N/A
24	SAE (group-dep.)	Secure	No	N/A	H2E only
25	FT-SAE (group-dep.)	Secure	No	N/A	H2E only

Protocol Status Notes¶

Broken¶

WEP (pre-AKM era): Fundamentally broken due to 24-bit IV space (birthday bound at ~5000 frames), CRC-32 linearity enabling bit-flipping, and weak RC4 key scheduling that leaks key bytes. PTW attack recovers 104-bit WEP keys from ~40,000 ARP frames; aircrack-ng default. FMS and KoreK are historical predecessors requiring more frames.

Deprecated¶

AKM 10 (APPeerKey): Removed from active use in IEEE 802.11-2020+. TKIP (cipher suite 2): Deprecated in 802.11-2012. Supported for backward compatibility in AKM 2 with keyver 1, but should not be deployed. TKIP's per-packet key mixing adds complexity but still relies on RC4.

Vulnerable (offline crackable)¶

AKMs 2, 4, 6, 19, 20 all derive the PMK from a passphrase via PBKDF2. The 4-way handshake exposes enough material (nonces, MIC, EAPOL frame) to perform offline verification of password candidates. Extract handshakes with WPAWolf and crack with hashcat. The computational cost is dominated by PBKDF2; ~8192 HMAC-SHA1 calls per candidate. Modern GPUs achieve ~500K–2M PMK/s on dedicated hardware.

AKM 6 PMKID: The hashcat 22000 aux4 routine uses HMAC-SHA1 for all WPA*01* lines; AKM 6 requires HMAC-SHA256. AKM 6 PMKIDs silently fail to crack even with the correct passphrase. Use EAPOL attack instead.

Secure (no offline attack)¶

SAE (AKM 8, 9, 24, 25): The Dragonfly commit frame contains a scalar and group element derived from both the password and per-session random values. An attacker cannot extract the password contribution without solving the discrete logarithm problem. Each password test requires an active interaction with the AP (online attack only, rate-limited).

Enterprise (AKM 1, 3, 5, 11–13, 22, 23): The PMK derives from the EAP Master Session Key. Whether the credentials are recoverable depends on the EAP inner method: EAP-TLS (certificate-based) = no offline attack; PEAP/ MSCHAPv2 (password-based inside TLS) = credentials can be extracted via rogue AP but cracking requires MSCHAPv2 hash format (mode 5500), not the WPA handshake.

OWE (AKM 18): No password. Protection is against passive eavesdropping only; a rogue AP can still intercept by acting as the legitimate AP.

FILS (AKM 14–17): Credentials are EAP-based (same as Enterprise). No offline attack against the key material itself.